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Abstract 
In response to the H1N1 influenza outbreak and the role of air travel in facilitating the virus’s 
rapid spread around the world, this paper contributes to debates concerning the governance 
of commercial aviation and infectious disease by examining the role of the Port Health 
Regulations and associated health security practices that are enacted at UK airports. 
Drawing on extensive action research and in-depth interviews that were conducted with key 
stakeholders in the aviation and health care sectors (including airport managers, ‘front line’ 
customer-facing airline staff, and public health clinicians) during the spring and early 
summer of 2009, we chart the development of sanitary regulations at UK airports and 
explore the challenges of performing health security screening at individual sites. In so 
doing, we identify a number of challenges that are associated with safeguarding public 
health against the dissemination of infectious diseases by air travel through UK airports. We 
also suggest that policy transfer may represent an effective mechanism through which best 
practice procedures from airports overseas could be adapted and incorporated in the UK.  
 
Keywords: health security, international travel, UK airports, infectious disease, policy 
transfer. 
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Introduction 
Owing to its status as one of the most aerially interconnected nations on earth, the United 
Kingdom is perhaps particularly vulnerable to the risk of infectious diseases being 
disseminated by airline passengers through its airports. In line with international trends, 
passenger air travel to and from the UK has grown significantly in recent years, 
simultaneously increasing the risk of overseas visitors importing ‘foreign’ diseases into the 
country and raising the risk of UK residents exporting infections abroad (HPA 2007, House 
of Lords 2007). In 2008, approximately 189 million international passengers used UK 
airports (CAA 2008a, 2008b). While the majority (125 million) travelled between the UK and 
countries of the European Union, significant numbers of people also travelled to and from 
destinations further afield. Figures from the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) indicate that, 
in 2008, 5.4 million people flew to/from the Middle East, 5.1 million travelled between the UK 
and the Far East, and 3.6 million flew to/from destinations in North Africa (CAA 2008b), 
regions in which all manner of infectious diseases may be endemic. In addition to exposing 
UK residents who travel overseas to the risks of ‘foreign’ infectious diseases, UK travellers 
similarly represent an epidemiological threat to other countries as they may transport strains 
of infectious disease that originated in the UK abroad. Such high volumes of long-distance 
international aeromobility, combined with the emergence of new transborder disease threats 
and the progressive liberalisation of the air transport sector pose a number of challenges to 
airports, airline operators, and Government regulators and make the provision of effective 
health security practices at UK airports inherently challenging. Drawing on extensive 
empirical research with key stakeholders from the aviation and public healthcare sectors, 
this paper identifies the challenges associated with delivering effective Port Health 
safeguards at UK airports and makes recommendations for improved practice.  
 
Developing sanitary measures for aviation 
As the SARS outbreak of 2002-2003 and, more recently, the 2009 H1N1 ‘swine flu’ 
pandemic, demonstrated, the movement of infectious diseases by air can have profound 
implications for human health and practices of international mobility (Royal and McCoubrey 
1989, Gerard 2002, Pang and Guindon 2004, Mangili and Gendreau 2005, Singer 2005, 
Bowen and Laroe 2006, Ali and Keil 2006, Colizza et al. 2006, Tatem et al. 2006, and Tatem 
and Hay 2007; Warren et al. 2010). Yet, while the potential for air passengers to incubate 
disease and/or inadvertently carry vectors of infection (such as live insects or insect larvae 
in their baggage or clothing) between countries was first recognised in the early 1920s, it 
was not until the introduction of regular long-haul passenger services in the 1930s that any 
coordinated attempts were made to regulate the movements of air passengers and airfreight 
to safeguard (initially Western but, later, global) public health from the threat of ‘foreign’ 
infectious diseases being transmitted between different countries by air (Budd et al. 2009). 
These measures, which included spraying passenger cabins with chemical pesticides to 
eradicate insects (a practice known as ‘disinsection’) and disinfecting aircraft, the isolation or 
quarantine of individual travellers, and mandatory vaccination certificates, inevitably raised 
political as well as epidemiological considerations and individual nations often adopted very 
different prophylactic (protective) strategies to try and counter the same biological threats 
(Baldwin 1999). Crucially, as Budd et al. (2009) have shown, enforcement of these different 
(often location-specific) regulations was logistically and politically problematic as those who 
were ignorant of the rules, or deliberately chose to circumvent them, undermined their 
effectiveness. 
 
In 1944, the international community, through the auspices of the recently formed 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), attempted to standardise the control of 
infectious diseases that were known to be transmitted by air through a package of 
internationally binding measures. Chapter II Article 14 of the resulting 1944 Chicago 
Convention on Civil Aviation stipulated that each contracting State must ‘take effective 
measures to prevent the spread by means of air navigation of cholera, typhus (epidemic), 
smallpox, yellow fever, plague, and other communicable diseases’ (ICAO 1944), while the 
International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation (1944) called for ‘special measures 
to prevent the spread by air across frontiers of epidemic or other communicable diseases’ 
(United Nations 1948 p.250).  
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While the provisions in the Chicago Convention undoubtedly advanced efforts to 
standardise aviation health security at the international level, individual states continued to 
devise their own protocols and debate how best to enshrine international directives into 
national law. At the time of the implementation of the ‘First Sanitary Convention for Aerial 
Navigation’ in 1935, the relatively small number of long-haul air travellers to/from the UK and 
the limited number of UK airports hosting international air services meant that it was 
comparatively easy for UK-based airlines, airport personnel, immigration officials, and 
customs officers to comply with the new health regulations. In 1948, only eight UK airports 
(plus one marine air terminal) supported scheduled international air services, of which only 
two, London and Prestwick (the latter simply by virtue of the fact that all long-haul 
transatlantic flights had to stop there to refuel), handled regular long-haul international air 
traffic (Table 1).  
 
** TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE *** 
 
As the network of long-haul passenger services grew after the Second World War, the need 
to introduce specific public health interventions for air travel to/from the UK became 
increasingly acute. A dedicated Health Control Unit was established at London Airport (now 
Heathrow) in 1947 to deal with the public health risks international aeromobility posed to the 
UK. Initially, this facility comprised a medical examination room that was staffed by a 
dedicated team of health practitioners but, as medical technology developed, x-ray 
machines and other diagnostic equipment were progressively installed to screen arriving 
passengers for signs of disease. The ‘moral panic’ which arose from an alleged link between 
rising levels of immigration by air to the UK (particularly from former British colonies in the 
Indian subcontinent) and rising rates of tuberculosis infection resulted in the implementation 
of a Port of Arrival or Port of Entry health screening system. Under this regime, certain 
groups of travellers, who were believed to represent a heightened disease risk by virtue of 
their nationality, were targeted for additional screening and examination. The 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act and 1971 Immigration Act subsequently empowered 
immigration officials to refer certain categories of travellers for medical inspection before 
they were admitted to the UK. Yet while these Acts detailed the treatment and examination 
of potentially infected travellers, they did not explicitly concern health security measures at 
airports or on aircraft (Welshman and Bashford 2006). 
 
By the mid-1950s, rising numbers of international airline passengers, combined with a 
growing number of airports offering international services, made the intensive surveillance 
and policing of individual travellers, which had been a cornerstone of international civil 
aviation health policy in the 1920s and 1930s, increasingly impractical and travellers were 
encouraged to take active responsibility for their own health and wellbeing (Tyrrell 1946; 
Turner 1971). Much of the health advice that was disseminated to airline passengers 
originated from research that was conducted in the field of ‘travel medicine’. This specialised 
sub-discipline of medical practice developed, in its current form, from the late nineteenth 
century onwards in response to realisation that international travel and increased human 
mobility exposed growing numbers of people to ‘exotic’ diseases for which they often had no 
awareness of or natural immunity to (Zuckerman 2002). The regulatory framework for 
sanitary aviation, which was devised in the early-to-mid twentieth century, only compelled 
international airline passengers to be inoculated against particular diseases. However, 
airlines and national Governments increasingly provided additional guidance on how 
passengers could safeguard their health while overseas by, for example, seeking shade 
during the heat of the day and avoiding certain raw food products (BOAC 1952). 
 
In England, the first specific national powers for applying health controls on commercial 
aircraft and at UK airports were contained within the Public Health (Aircraft) Regulations Act 
1979 and the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984. These regulations were revised 
and updated in 2007 to form the Public Health (Aircraft) (Amendment) (England) 
Regulations 2007. These regulations form one part of a package of legislative measures 
that are collectively termed the ‘Port Health Regulations’. Similar legislation exists, or is 
planned, for the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. The 
Port Health Regulations define the measures that should be taken at airports against both 
arriving and departing passengers, crew, and aircraft to limit any potential risks to public 
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health and reduce the spread of infection. These interventions include the medical 
examination of potential entrants to the UK, the grounding of aircraft and, if required, the 
detention of passengers, crew, cargo, and equipment until local health authorities are 
satisfied that no disease threat exists (HPA 2006a). Significantly, there are far fewer 
provisions for preventing UK-based travellers from exporting infectious diseases overseas 
and ‘Port of Origin’ health security at airports remains an area of commercial air transport 
policy that has received scant academic attention to date. 
 
Safeguarding public health at UK airports: the regulatory context 
The main statutory responsibility for implementing the Port Health Regulations at UK entry 
points, which include seaports, international railway stations, and airports, rests with the 
local authority in which the facility is sited. Some local authorities in areas of heightened 
transportation activity are specifically designated as Port Health Authorities (PHAs). These 
PHAs were created in the second half of the nineteenth century to perform Port Health 
functions at entry points to the UK with the aim of preventing the international dissemination 
of dangerous communicable diseases, initially by ships, but now also by international rail 
and air services (see Hawker et al. 2005). While maritime ports had been dealing with the 
threat of international disease transmission since the fourteenth century, the limited number 
of marine passengers, and the length of time they were at sea, meant that any symptoms of 
infection would develop during the journey and manifest themselves on arrival. In 
comparison, the speed of air travel enabled latently infected individuals to travel around the 
world without displaying visible signs of infection and so different health security techniques 
were required. In the UK, the task of providing or commissioning specialist staff to 
implement the Port Health Regulations at all (air/sea/rail) ports rests with the Local 
Authority, the local Primary Care Trust (a division of the NHS in England that provides some 
primary and community health services), or the national Health Protection Agency. The 
majority of personnel employed by these institutions are either registered medical 
practitioners or certified environmental health officers. In the case of airports, out-of-hours 
cover is usually operated on a rota basis with General Practitioners (GPs) being contracted 
to perform medical checks in the event of an out-of-hours public health incident.  
 
As Budd et al. (in preparation) suggest, the recent introduction of regular international air 
services to and from UK regional airports has meant that some local authorities (simply by 
virtue of having an airport located within their administrative boundaries) have had to rapidly 
assume a Port Health function for which they often had no prior experience. Between 1948 
and 2008 the number of UK airports handling international services increased from eight to 
41, with the majority of these new services being inaugurated since 2002 (DfT 2005). This 
fundamental change in the spatial provision of international air services from the UK was the 
result of central Government policy that sought to promote the growth of UK regional 
airports by liberalising the bilateral air service agreements that had previously regulated the 
routes that could be flown from each individual airport (DfT 2003). As well as providing new 
route development opportunities for UK carriers, the UK Government also invited 
applications from foreign airlines that wished to operate new international services from 
regional airports (DfT 2005). As a result, Emirates of the UAE, Pakistan International 
Airlines, and Continental Airlines of the United States, now operate regular long-haul 
international services to/from a number of regional UK airports (CAA 2007). As a 
consequence of rapidly assuming this new role as sites of long distance international 
aeromobility, the provisions for safeguarding public health at some of the smaller regional 
airports in the UK are less well established. In subsequent sections of this paper we discuss 
the challenges associated with providing health security procedures at all these new points 
of entry. 
 
Safeguarding public health at UK airports: an empirical investigation 
 
Method 
The empirical material that informs this research was obtained through sixteen in-depth 
interviews and associated action research with key stakeholders in the UK aviation and 
public healthcare sectors. The research was conducted over a five-month period between 
February and July 2009. Interviewees included members of the senior management team at 
airports, airline employees, front-line airport operations personnel, and healthcare 
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practitioners based at (or working with) airports in the Midlands and South East of England. 
These regions were selected for analysis because they provide a useful contrast between a 
region that has been a centre for long-haul aviation since the early 1920s (the south east) 
and a region that has only recently become a site of regular long-haul international 
aeromobility (the Midlands). Moreover, since the H1N1 influenza virus reportedly entered 
the UK through a Midlands airport, the need to examine the Port Health procedures that are 
in place in this region is acute. Interviewees were identified by their job title and then 
personally invited, by email and/or telephone, to participate in the research. Additional 
participants were recruited on the recommendation of these initial contacts.  
 
Our sixteen interviewees were drawn from a range of professions and included airport 
operations directors and terminal duty managers at four UK airports (including a major 
facility in the southeast of England), airline personnel (including check-in staff, cabin crew, 
pilots, flight dispatchers, and base managers), and medical practitioners who had a Port 
Health responsibility(see Table 2). The latter group included both ‘front line’ nursing staff 
and senior managers/policy directors at regional health headquarters. At the request of our 
interviewees, no individual airports or staff members have been identified. All interviews, bar 
three telephone interviews, were conducted face-to-face and lasted a minimum of one hour. 
With the exception of the three telephone interviews, all other interviews were conducted by 
two members of the research team at the interviewee’s place of employment. Many of these 
interviews were augmented with guided tours of, and action research in, airport Port Health 
facilities.  
 
***TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Action research represents a systematic and interactive research technique that allows 
researchers to obtain detailed understandings of the actions, processes, and environment in 
which particular institutional or regulatory practices are performed and the ways in which 
different groups of people interact (Robertson 2000, Deutsch 2005). In the context of the 
present research, the opportunity to conduct action research in airport terminals enabled the 
research team to objectively observe the unique Port Heath environment of different airports 
and understand how people work together to provide Port Health safeguards. This enabled 
us gain an appreciation of how existing health security practices are enacted at different 
sites and the daily challenges associated with delivering them.  
 
The sixteen interviews and associated action research revealed three key areas of concern 
for stakeholders. The first relates to organisational complexity, which is reported to 
obfuscate clear lines of command and responsibility in the event of a public health incident. 
The second concerns perceived inadequacies in the communication channels between 
different agencies involved in Port Health provision, while the third arises from broader 
financial and practical constraints. Though these issues do not exist in isolation, indeed 
there is often considerable overlap and interaction between them, the following subsections 
detail the key research findings. 
 
1. Organisation complexity 
The privatisation of UK airports, combined with the outsourcing of health care providers in 
the UK, has meant that Port Health has become a highly complex undertaking with 
numerous local, national, and international public and private agencies involved in its 
provision.  Many of the practitioners to whom we spoke indicated that this complexity 
stemmed, at least in part, from the 1974 reorganisation of the National Health Service and 
the eventual subsequent creation of Strategic Health Authorities, Primary Care Trusts, and 
the Health Protection Agency; interventions by the Home Office, the Departments for Health 
and Transport, the UK Border Agency, the police, and HM Revenue and Customs. In 
addition, the progressive deregulation, privatisation, and commercialisation of the UK’s 
aviation sector has resulted in a proliferation of private companies operating within the 
airport industry. Scholars, including Humphreys and Francis (2002), have previously 
attested to the diverse pattern of airport ownership in the UK but, as far as we are aware, 
little or no research has investigated the implications of this changing corporate environment 
for practices of airport health security. At the time of writing, six UK airports are owned and 
operated by BAA, four are owned and operated by Manchester Airports Group, three major 
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facilities are owned and operated by the Peel Group, while the remainder are owned by a 
mixture of private enterprise and/or local authorities. As a consequence, airports that are not 
part of a bigger airport group have little or no access to ‘best practice’ frameworks and 
cannot easily benchmark their own Port Health protocols or evaluate their performance 
against similarly-sized facilities. Tellingly, several interviewees asked the research team how 
their own Port Health strategies and health security practices compared with those of other 
UK airports:  
 
“Part of the problem is we’ve no real idea of what’s being done at [a neighbouring airport] so 
we don’t know how our own policies and procedures compare.”  
                 (Terminal Duty Manager, Midlands) 
 
At the same time, other airport personnel spoke of their desire to facilitate dialogue between 
neighbouring facilities and of the need to improve the clarity of Port Health documents they 
received from healthcare and Government agencies.  
 
The existence of numerous different external and internal airport departments and 
companies, each with their own priorities, acronyms and sets of working procedures, was a 
particular bone of contention with our interviewees. Many alleged that the jurisdiction and/or 
responsibilities of the (often new or restructured) regulatory and healthcare agencies was 
not always clear. This was particularly pronounced in respect of health service provision, 
with the acronyms NHS, SHA (Strategic Health Authority), PCT (Primary Care Trust), LHA  
(Local Health Authority), HPU (Health Protection Unit) and PHA (Port Health Authority), 
used interchangeably and often incorrectly by our interviewees. Our respondents also 
perceived there to be a lack of stability within these individual organizations. Several of our 
interviewees also expressed frustration that, in the event of an emerging Port Health 
incident, time was often wasted in trying to establish who they should be liaising with and 
verifying whether that individual had the necessary authority to take decisions. As one 
respondent commented: 
 
“Often I don’t know who it is I need to speak to [in the event of a public health incident at the 
airport] and it takes me ages to ascertain whether or not that person has the authority to 
take decisions. This wastes valuable time” 
                   (Airport Operations Manager, Midlands) 
 
2. Communication within airports 
In addition to working within this complex organisational framework, several front-line airline 
staff claimed existing communication channels were convoluted and ambiguous. While 
some departments and organisations operating within individual airports had clearly 
prescribed and well-rehearsed checklists of Port Health procedures, this appeared to be the 
exception rather than the norm and we were struck both by the lack of understanding of the 
Port Health provisions and inconsistencies in their application within individual airports. 
Here, examples from our interviews and action research ranged from the mundane and 
procedural – for example, uncertainly as to whether UK nationals suspected of carrying 
tuberculosis had to consent to health screening on arrival at the UK border – to public health 
‘emergencies’, including an incident where a passenger on an inbound flight was suspected 
of carrying an infectious disease. On that occasion, passengers were detained on the 
aircraft for a number of hours while the situation was assessed by medical practitioners. At 
the time of interview, we discovered a lack of alignment and understanding within the airport 
between the airport operator and the airline concerned, with each expressing the belief that 
the situation was the other company’s responsibility. 
 
Our interviewees suggested such confusion was often a consequence of poor information 
dissemination protocols which meant that details of critical health security practices, and 
appropriate responses to emerging incidents, were not being effectively shared with front 
line staff. Possible solutions, including making familiarity with Port Health security 
procedures a mandatory part of staff training programmes and ensuring that a named 
contact person regularly liaised with airlines, the airport, and healthcare providers, to provide 
updated advice to all staff, were advanced. While, in theory, the UK’s Health Protection 
Agency has assumed the operational lead for ensuring that there is a single point of contact 
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for Port Health and medical inspection services at all UK airports, our interviewees indicated 
that further investment may be required to realise this goal. 
 
3. Practical and financial constraints 
Finally, and in addition to the issues discussed above, there are a number of practical and 
financial difficulties associated with safeguarding public health at UK airports that require 
further attention. The progressive privatisation and commercialisation of UK airports that 
resulted from the 1986 Airports Act has meant that airports are increasingly reliant on non-
aeronautical revenue streams, much of which is derived from retailing (Humphreys 1999). 
While the implications of increased airport retailing on airport operators and the airline 
passenger experience have been widely commented upon (see, for example, Lloyd 2003, 
Freathy 2004, Kesselring 2008), the implications for Port Health and the provision of 
passenger health security have been overlooked. Indeed, though the provision of Port 
Health facilities is a statutory requirement for airports supporting international services, Port 
Health does not represent a revenue stream for the airport operator and many healthcare 
practitioners complained that insufficient space is reserved for Port Health activities as a 
consequence. Notwithstanding the fact that international airports have to have Port Health 
cover as a condition of their operating licence, some airports reportedly charge rent for the 
space Port Health providers occupy. One interviewee, based in the southeast of England, 
revealed that his organisation pays almost a quarter of its total annual budget in rent to the 
operator of the local airport in order to maintain a medical examination room in the 
passenger terminal. When asked to expand on this, he/she remarked that the legislative 
requirements only state that Port Health facilities have to be provided and, almost certainly 
reflecting the age in which they were drafted, they do not stipulate that airports have to 
provide these facilities rent-free.  
 
In addition to issues of cost, certain practical problems also exacerbate the challenges of 
providing effective Port Health safeguards. The procedural architecture of airports means 
that there are only two funnelling points – immigration and customs – through which all 
arriving passengers must pass, and only one – the central security search area - for 
departing passengers. Consequently, any point of entry/origin health screening has to be 
performed at one of these locations. However, the immigration hall is designed to expedite 
the speedy processing of would-be entrants into the UK and the central security search area 
is designed to prevent terrorist attacks and very few airports have space in either location in 
which health screening technologies could be installed. Moreover, commercial agreements 
between airports and airlines stipulate the maximum time that passengers can be delayed in 
security queues. Introducing health screening measures would almost certainly cause these 
limits to be exceeded and result in financial penalties for the airport or the private screening 
company that is contracted to perform passenger searches. Having said that, some 
respondents suggested that there may be scope for introducing some sort of mobile 
screening technology that could be moved to different areas of the terminal building as 
required to screen either arriving or departing passengers. 
 
Currently, the responsibility for identifying potentially infected/infectious travellers arriving at 
the UK border falls to the UK Border Agency. Individual immigration officers must evaluate 
not only the originality and veracity of immigration documents but also assess whether 
individual travellers pose a health risk. Existing protocols mean that travellers without EU, 
North American, Australian, New Zealand or other ‘Western’ passports will be subject to 
more scrutiny (from both an immigration and an epidemiological perspective) than those that 
do. Under this system, certain groups of travellers can be easily identified and referred for 
additional immigration and/or health checks before being admitted to the UK. At the time of 
writing, Department of Health guidelines require UK airports to screen potential entrants 
from tuberculosis prevalent areas using chest x-rays. However, only two UK airports – 
London/Heathrow and London/Gatwick – have the facilities to undertake chest radiography 
on site. At all other airports, information on new entrants is passed to the local Health 
Protection Agency office for follow up. However, this process is far from perfect as entrants 
may be ‘lost to the system’ or fail to attend follow-up appointments at local screening 
centres.  
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“I don’t know how many people get ‘lost’ to the system each year, but I know, anecdotally, 
from colleagues, that loads of people don’t attend their follow up checks at local hospitals” 
               (Director of Public Health, Midlands) 
 
Not only does this have huge cost implications for the NHS, it also has important public 
health implications. Our research also discovered that the follow up procedures are 
inconsistent across the UK and the practices that are performed at one site may differ 
substantially from those at another. 
 
At present, chest radiography represents the only medical screening technology that is 
routinely employed to safeguard public health at UK airports, but this is only available on-
site at the UK’s two busiest airports. The benefits of introducing other screening 
technologies, most notably thermal imaging cameras, have been debated in response to 
different disease threats and some newspaper journalists have suggested that the UK 
should employ the same technologies as major airports overseas (Smith 2003, Wright 
2003). However, the use of such screening technology invokes all manner of ethical, 
financial, technological, and practical concerns. Our research uncovered evidence of 
considerable disagreement between stakeholders, with positions being polarised between 
those who felt that all possible measures should be taken to prevent the transmission of 
infectious disease by air travel and others who felt that the proposed new screening 
technologies go far beyond what is reasonable and infringe the privacy of individual 
travellers. For example, the use of backscatter or ‘naked’ x-ray scanners at airports, 
deployed in the UK following the attempted detonation of a bomb on a passenger flight 
above the USA on Christmas Day 2009, had already been the subject of considerable 
debate (Murphy and Wilds 2001; Klitou 2008). At present, these machines are solely used to 
‘see’ under clothing to detect concealed weapons, explosives, or contraband (Cavoukian 
2009) and are not designed to detect overt or latent signs of infection. In the future, it may 
prove possible to incorporate some form of health screening technology, such as thermal 
imaging, into these systems. Yet, practitioners to whom we spoke indicated that an entirely 
separate technology, based on a different set of metrics, would need to be developed. 
 
Finally, and as a consequence of recent terrorist attacks against commercial aircraft, almost 
all available space in the passenger security search area is now devoted to anti-terrorist 
security measures, leaving insufficient capacity for Port Health professionals to conduct exit 
screening. This situation requires closer investigation as, historically, the UK has been as 
much an exporter of infectious disease (such as foot and mouth disease and H1N1) as an 
importer (Parsons 2009, Green 2009, Nottingham Evening Post 2009, Bosely 2009).  
  
Learning from others: the potential for policy transfer 
We believe there would be considerable merit in assessing the health security practices 
performed at airports overseas. We foresee significant scope for future work with 
practitioners and policymakers in identifying lessons that can be applied in a UK context. 
Port Health practitioners already informally compare UK practices with those undertaken 
abroad. For example, two senior managers made unprompted reference to the health 
declaration questionnaire that the United States administer to some airline passengers 
alongside conventional landing cards, while four others gave informal assessments of the 
relative merits of different screening technologies and quarantine practices. For certain 
medical practitioners, antigen mediated nasal swabs and, ultimately, molecular testing, are 
the preferred means of screening for influenza, but they recognise that these procedures 
would: be expensive and time consuming to produce and process; require trained staff to 
administer the swabs and analyse the results; and raise ethical concerns. We advocate a 
policy transfer approach in order to assess more systematically the possibility of 
incorporating effective practice from other locations and jurisdictions. Policy transfer has 
been defined as: 
 
‘[a] process by which actors borrow policies developed in one setting to develop 
programmes and policies in another’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, p.357)     
 
Variations of this concept – also known as ‘convergence’, ‘policy-oriented learning’ and 
‘lesson-drawing’ - have been used to develop frameworks in a number of areas of public 
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policy, including environmental protection (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996), urban planning 
(Dolowitz and Medearis 2009), data protection (Bennett 1988, 1991, 1997) and regulation of 
the energy sector (Eberlein and Newman 2008). Successful policy transfer recognises the 
limits of ‘vertical’ modes of governance and can result in innovative approaches, often 
involving epistemic networks, to specific problems (Eberlein and Newman 2008; Dolowitz 
and Medearis 2009). Yet, to our knowledge, this process has not been fully utilised in the 
field of Port Health. There is scope to connect perspectives on Port Health in the UK airport 
setting in ways that explain why certain procedures work and develop them in a format that 
can be transferred to other jurisdictions.  In the international policy context, it is vital that we 
appreciate how and why international directives for sanitary aviation are formulated and 
enacted in different countries and at individual airports. This would enable the implications of 
these variations in practice on global public health to be more rigorously examined.       
 
Discussion and recommendations 
Our interviews and action research – albeit from a small sample of UK airports - provide 
compelling evidence that stakeholders believe the efficacy of the existing Port Health 
system at UK airports is being compromised by institutional complexity, poor 
communication, and by practical and financial constraints. Indeed, the complexity of the 
existing Port Health regulations, combined with the multifaceted pattern of airport ownership 
and health service provision in the UK, renders the challenge of delivering effective Port 
Health safeguards considerable. We noticed a sense of frustration among stakeholders who 
strive to ‘do the right thing’ by both their employers and the travelling public, yet often 
perceive their impact to be restricted by inefficient working practices and outdated public 
health priorities. For example, and with respect to the latter point, medical practitioners 
expressed concern that the continued emphasis on the epidemiological risks associated 
with tuberculosis may mean the threats posed by new and emerging infectious diseases are 
not sufficiently prioritised. While there is a clear need for further research in this area, our 
findings identify: a clear need to improve the clarity of the existing Port Health 
documentation; a requirement to make explicit the responsibility of different agencies; and 
the necessity of fostering closer working links and dialogue between and among stakeholder 
groups. Taken together, these measures should alleviate some of the difficulties currently 
associated with the existing regulations. In the short to medium term, therefore, we suggest 
that the introduction of a structured three-tier system of health screening may (depending on 
the nature of the disease threat) be appropriate for use in UK airports (Table 3). 
 
***INSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Conclusion 
Recent outbreaks of highly infectious human diseases, including SARS and the H5N1 and 
H1N1 strains of influenza, have illustrated the continued epidemiological vulnerability 
associated with mass international air travel to and from the UK. Drawing on extensive 
archival research and fieldwork interviews with key stakeholders in the aviation and health 
care sectors, this paper documented the development of sanitary regulations at UK airports 
and explored the current practices of health security that are performed at individual sites. In 
many cases, we noted that the Port Health procedures and individual staff responsibilities 
are not always well understood and not prioritised. As a result, airport and airline staff 
reported that they felt unfamiliar with the procedures and unsure what to do in the event of 
an emerging Port Health incident. In an effort to heighten awareness of the difficulties Port 
Health practitioners face in trying to ensure effective health security at UK airports, we have 
highlighted three areas of concern and offered a number of recommendations that may 
improve current procedures. In the longer term, it may be beneficial to adopt a policy 
transfer approach, in which UK airports learn from practices overseas to enhance not only 
health security practices in the UK but also internationally. 
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